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This paper evaluates how microfinance performed 
in providing business financing in 27 Sub-Saharan 
African countries. It uses data from the 2009 and 2010 
Gallup World Poll, a nationally-representative survey 
of at least 1,000 individuals per country, conducted 
in up to 157 countries per year. The data, supported 
by rigorous statistical evidence in related literature on 
the use of microcredit around the world, demonstrate 
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that economic gains from microcredit have been more 
modest than what was once believed. On the other 
hand, the analysis suggests that the poor save in order 
to start new businesses and that the introduction of 
formal products for small savings can be a key financial 
innovation. The authors also analyze the challenges the 
poor face in setting money aside to save, and discuss what 
policymakers can do to promote savings. 
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1.  Introduction 
The law of diminishing marginal productivity dictates that scarce resources earn a high 
return. Why, then, does capital not flow to the poor, its most productive users? This has been 
attributed in part to the failure of credit markets. The argument goes that the poor have so little to 
offer by way of collateral, and borrow such small amounts, that it is too risky and too expensive 
to lend to them. The ramification is that they get caught in a credit-based poverty trap, wherein 
they are unable to undertake profitable investments due to credit constraints and, hence, remain 
poor. The great promise of microcredit – making joint-liability loans to small groups of poor 
people possessing no collateral, enabling them to make productive investments – was to be the 
magic bullet against poverty. Yet, a mere five years after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to 
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, claims about microcredit‟s transformative power are 
being debated.  
Supporters  of  microcredit  still  maintain  that  it  is  capable  of  raising  incomes  and 
consumption,  empowering  women,  fostering  a  feeling  of  community  and  establishing 
creditworthiness and financial self-sufficiency. However, nay-sayers contend that it can lead to 
over-indebtedness resulting in perpetual poverty and crowds out other anti-poverty interventions. 
In order to understand the stakes involved in this debate, consider this: as of December 2009, of 
the $21.3 billion in cross-border funds committed to microcredit, $14.6 billion (68.5 percent) 
came from aid agencies and development institutions as grants or as highly subsidized debt (El-
Zaghbi, Gähweiler and Lauer, 2011). In the absence of hard evidence definitively supporting the 
wealth-creation role of microcredit, it is questionable whether it makes sense to channel so much 
money into it, at the cost of other, competing anti-poverty investments. 3 
 
Different strands of the literature have examined the varied claims about the positive 
impacts of microcredit, but the evidence continues to be mixed. While most studies find that 
access to microcredit enables households to better smooth and enhance consumption, the picture 
around other claims remains murky.  
We evaluate microcredit in its purported income-enhancing role – Do small loans enable 
the  poor  to  make  productive  investments?  In  this  context,  we  document  the  low  use  of 
microcredit  for  business  purposes  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA)..    We  discuss  the  potential 
reasons behind this low usage, and examine how SSA fits in with the patterns and predictions of 
the  academic  evidence  on  microcredit.  We  also  evaluate  a  new  avatar  of  microfinance  – 
microsavings. We review the literature on savings as well as the evidence from the ground to 
show how savings might be positioned to yield the gains that were expected from credit. Finally, 
we discuss the behavioral and institutional challenges that the poor face in saving money and the 
policy prescriptions for overcoming these challenges. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we review the related literature and motive 
for empirical analysis; Sections 3 and 4 discuss financial inclusion data from SSA, in the context 
of the microcredit and microsavings movements, respectively; Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Review of the Literature on Microfinance and Returns to Capital 
Rigorous  experimental  evidence  establishing  a  causal  link  (or  lack  thereof)  between 
access to microcredit and growth of microenterprises is hard to come by. Selection bias prevents 
direct comparisons between those who borrow from microfinance institutions (MFIs) and those 
who  do  not.  Similarly,  the  lack  of  a  counterfactual  makes  it  impossible  to  gauge  how  the 
borrowers would have fared in the absence of credit. The first quasi-experimental study in this 4 
 
area is Pitt and Khandker (1998), who utilize Grameen‟s loan eligibility threshold of 0.5 acres of 
land  as  a  discontinuity  in  a  maximum  likelihood  model.  While  their  paper  focuses  on 
consumption-related outcomes (which are large and positive, especially for women), they also 
look at labor supply, including self-employment hours. This effect is found to be marginally 
positive for women but negative for men. Since the same study finds substantial consumption 
gains, this might suggest that micro-credit makes people substitute away from productive work 
and towards leisure. That said, the findings from this paper, have been challenged by Morduch 
(1999),  who  shows  that  the  eligibility  threshold  was  not  strictly  enforced,  invalidating  the 
identifying assumption. 
The first truly experimental evidence on this subject comes from Banerjee et al. (2009) 
who worked with an MFI called Spandana based in Hyderabad, India. Their experiment entails a 
random roll-out of MFI branches in half of 104 selected slums, with the remaining half being the 
control  group.  They  find  that  15-18  months  after  lending  begins,  there  is  a  positive,  albeit 
insignificant, difference between the profitability of existing businesses in treatment and control 
areas. Importantly, the rate of creation of new businesses is significantly higher with 32 percent 
more businesses created in treatment areas. The most interesting aspect is the heterogeneity in 
the  treatment  effect  across  households.  Households  with  differential  propensities  to  become 
business  owners  display  differential  rates  of  substitution  between  durable  and  non-durable 
consumption:  those  with  an  existing  business  increased  investment  without  cutting  back  on 
current  consumption;  those  with  a  high  propensity  to  become  business  owners  increased 
investment spending and decreased current consumption – an artifact of the high fixed cost of 
starting a business; those with a low propensity simply increased current consumption with no 
accompanying effects on durable consumption spending. A key takeaway here is that, contrary to 5 
 
what  was  believed,  providing  access  to  credit  to  all  will  not  make  an  entrepreneur  out  of 
everybody.  
A closely related study is by Crépon et al. (2011) in rural Morocco. This intervention 
involved randomly offering microcredit to one out of two villages in 81 matched pairs. They find 
that providing access to microcredit did not lead to new business creation, only to an expansion 
in the scale of existing businesses. Households with no existing business at baseline merely 
increased consumption once they got access to credit. This again reminds us that credit, by itself, 
cannot  spawn  entrepreneurs.  Like  Pitt  and  Khandker  (1998),  they  also  find  that  treated 
households  decreased  their  wage  employment  and  increased  their  consumption  of  leisure, 
offsetting  the  income  gains  realized  from  the  scale  expansion  of  existing  businesses.  If  this 
finding has external validity, it not only casts a shadow on the income generating potential of 
microcredit, but also raises longer term questions about the borrowers‟ ability to repay their 
loans and/or the possibility of chronic indebtedness. 
Kaboski and Townsend (2011) also utilize village level differentials in access to credit, 
albeit through an entirely different channel. They study the impact of the Thai Million Baht 
Village Fund program, under which the government of Thailand provided a million baht to each 
of the country‟s 80,000 villages to start a rural bank. The exogenous variation stems from the 
fact that all villages got the same amount, irrespective of their population. As a result, there was 
a huge variation in the per capita expansion of credit across villages. The authors construct a 
structural model and use a panel of 960 households from 64 villages for estimation. They find 
significant  increases  in  consumption,  but  no  impact  on  average  investment.  Similar  to  the 
preceding  two  papers,  this  one  also  finds  heterogeneous  effects,  with  a  small  subset  of 
households choosing to increase its investment spending. However, this increase is more than 6 
 
offset by a larger subset of households that substitute towards present consumption as borrowing 
becomes cheap. 
Karlan and Zinman (2010a, b) measure the impact of microfinance at the individual level 
by studying marginal loan applicants to a Manila-based urban lender that uses a credit scoring 
algorithm for its lending decisions. This study only targets existing microentrepreneurs (this was 
a qualification requirement, and the mean number of businesses held by applicant households is 
1.15),  so  the  impact  on  new  business  creation  cannot  be  analyzed.  For  existing  businesses, 
surprisingly, the findings suggest a scale contraction after getting access to microcredit. The 
operative channel for this seems to be the shedding of unproductive workers, but the reasons for 
this aren‟t really clear. Business profits increase for male entrepreneurs, but decline for female 
entrepreneurs, the target constituency of most MFIs.  
The desultory evidence from these studies can be a little disconcerting after having heard 
poignant  stories  of  the  destitute  finding  freedom  from  poverty  through  microcredit.  Indeed, 
anecdotes about the positive impact of microcredit abound in the popular press. However, it is 
useful to temper our expectations with the fact that isolated success stories do nothing to educate 
us about how something performs on average. This is equally true on the flip side: individual 
tales  of  microcredit‟s  spectacular  failure,  leaving  in  its  wake  entire  villages  of  debt-ridden 
farmers, who en-masse chose to default, do not address its overall performance. This is why the 
current body of work on microcredit, with its few but rigorous experimental studies that take into 
account both gainers and losers, as well as the sizeable majority who are neither, provides us 
with the only reliable evidence on its efficacy. 
In fact, the lesson from the current literature bears repeating: large doses of microcredit 
might not be useful for creating new businesses, on average, due to borrower heterogeneity. This 7 
 
is  not  to  say  that  its  consumption-smoothing  and  risk-coping  functions  are  not  valuable  in 
themselves. In fact, Collins et al. (2009) document that just to meet these needs, the poor juggle 
complex financial transactions on a daily basis. However, it is possible to achieve these benefits 
through other innovations like micro-savings (discussed later in the paper) and micro-insurance, 
which displace other pro-poor interventions to a much smaller degree.  
The bigger puzzle here is that of existing businesses. Evidence has been inconclusive as 
to  whether  microcredit  fosters  investment  in  incumbent  firms.  This  is  surprising,  given  that 
limited  access  to  finance  is  frequently  stated  as  a  stumbling  block  to  business  growth  by 
entrepreneurs in developing countries; for example, 30.9 percent of firm owners in the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey list access to finance as a major constraint to growth.
1 Using regulatory 
changes in the Indian banking sector as a natural experiment, Banerjee and Duflo (2008 ) also 
find evidence that medium-sized enterprises are stymied by credit constraints. Both of these 
studies include large and medium sized firms, and this handicap  is even more pronounced for 
small  firms.    In  fact,  Beck,  Demirgüç-Kunt  and  Maksimovic  (2007)   find  that  financing 
constraints impede growth by 10 percent for small firms, as against 6 percent for large firms. 
Worse, Sabarwal and Terrell (2009) find  evidence from Latin America consistent with the fact 
that when women own small or medium enterprises , they are less likely than men to receive 
formal credit when they apply for it. 
Why, then, do small firms not borrow from MFIs? One possible factor driving low usage 
could be that returns to capital in microenterprises are low and therefore it does not make sense 
for their owners to borrow money to invest in them. However, multiple pieces of evidence allow 
us to negate this possibility.  
                                                           
1 The complete World Bank Enterprise Survey dataset is available at: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. 8 
 
The first evidence comes from the literature on returns to capital in developing countries. 
Udry and Anagol (2006) estimate 150 to 250 percent annual returns to pineapple cultivation 
(more capital-intensive than the traditional crops) in Ghana. Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2011) 
also  find  very  high  returns  (ranging  between  52  percent  and  85  percent,  annualized)  to  the 
relatively  low  capital-intensive  task  of  applying  fertilizer  to  the  maize  crop  in  rural  Kenya. 
Returns are similarly high for non-agricultural microenterprises. In a randomized control trial 
(RCT) involving a subset of microenterprises in Sri Lanka, de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff 
(2008) find the average return on capital to be as high as 4 percent per month; high returns to 
capital are similarly found among a group of microenterprises in Ghana (Fafchamp et al., 2011). 
In a very similar intervention in Mexico, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) find this return to be in 
the range of 20-33 percent per month.  
The fact that business-owners do utilize other sources of money to meet their borrowing 
needs (money lenders, friends and family, etc.) attests to the fact that they are not unwilling to 
borrow. We examine this phenomenon more closely in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
in the following section. We also evaluate financial access in SSA more broadly, in order to gain 
better insight into business-related financing.  
 
3.  Microcredit in Sub-Saharan Africa 
3.1  Gallup World Poll Database 
The micro-level data that we analyze in this paper come from the 2009 and 2010 waves 
of  the  Gallup  World  Poll.
2  The  Gallup  World  Poll  is  a  nationally  representative  survey 
comprising annually up to 150,000 individuals from up to 157 countries. The core Gallup World 
Poll questionnaire includes detailed demographic, employment, and income information, as well 
                                                           
2 For additional information, see: https://worldview.gallup.com. 9 
 
as self-reported perceptions, such as of personal “wellbeing”, government, politics, and religion. 
The 2009 round of the poll added several new questions in SSA in order to measure financial 
inclusion.  The  measurement  was  done  along  the  following  three  dimensions:  use  of  bank 
accounts, credit allocation and risk mitigation. We utilize this data for SSA countries in our 
evaluation of the role of microfinance in business-creation. We report data averaged by country 
over 2009 and 2010 since some countries only have data available for one of the two years and 
while other have data for both years.  
 
3.2   Evidence on Microfinance Usage and Awareness 
In the previous section, we briefly examined the current literature on microcredit and its 
role in creating and expanding businesses. Since most studies show less than expected utilization 
of microcredit, it is useful to first look at perceptions and uses of various sources of financing. 
The Gallup World Poll asks what sources of financing individuals would consider using to start a 
new business. The data show that 42.3 percent of all responders in SSA state family as the 
primary source of funds for potential business needs (Figure 1). Community savings groups (also 
known  as  ROSCAs  –  Rotating  Savings  and  Credit  Associations),  through  which  groups  of 
people save money together, are a popular mode of savings in parts of Africa and are cited as a 
source of funds by about 10 percent of those surveyed.  Importantly, commercial banks are 
reported by about 20 percent of responders (though not all respondents necessarily have the 
collateral and/or credit history to access formal bank financing). 
Notably, in none of the Sub-Saharan countries surveyed, does the proportion of people 
willing to borrow from MFIs exceed 17 percent, and the mean for all SSA countries is a meager 
4.3 percent. Not all of this difference between the borrowing rates from community networks and 10 
 
MFIs  is  attributable  to  informal  insurance  and  risk-sharing  mechanisms,  as  16  percent  cite 
commercial banks as their potential go-to source for business funds.  
 
Figure 1: Sources of Start-up Financing, by Country (average 2009-10) 
 
      Source: Gallup World Poll 2009 and 2010.   
 
It would be quite natural to wonder at this point as to why this distinction is important. 
After all, shouldn‟t the source of a loan be immaterial as long as the poor have someone to 
borrow from when the need arises? However, the literature draws a clear advantage of access to 
formal lending institutions for a number of reasons. For instance, Collins et al. (2009) observed 
that microcredit is far more reliable, in terms of both availability and price, than one‟s informal 

































network. Closely related to this is the fact that relatives and friends may not have much to lend if 
there has been an adverse shock that has affected everybody contemporaneously. Another issue 
that a microentrepreneur who leverages his informal network for business funds might face is 
that of reciprocity – having to lend money to someone else during their time of need might starve 
the lender‟s business of much needed funds. This risk of having to lend to family and friends is 
well  documented.  For  instance,  Baland,  Guirkinger  and  Mali  (2007)  present  evidence  from 
Cameroon, where a large number of individuals borrow money (and pay interest on it) from 
credit cooperatives for no other reason other than to appear poor in order to avoid having to lend 
to family and friends.   
The potential benefit from promoting access to formal lending institutions is high in SSA 
since there are a substantial number of small and micro enterprises. According to calculations 
from Schneider (2002), the informal economy accounted for 43.2 percent of GNP for SSA in 
1999-2000 and 81 percent of those employed in the informal economy in SSA (excluding South 
Africa) are self employed (ILO, 2002). Add to this the fact that women, either by choice or by 
necessity, work disproportionately more in the informal sector – according to the World Bank 
Development Report (2004), the proportion of the female non-agricultural labor force that works 
in the informal sector is more than 95 percent in Benin, Chad and Mali, and more than 80 percent 
in  Guinea  and  Kenya.  These  are  the  very  people  who  run  corner  grocery  stores  and  small 
tailoring shops – the small entrepreneurs, especially women, that microfinance set out to target. 
Since  less  than  3  percent  of  them  borrow  from  MFIs  today  (CGAP  and  MIX,  2010),  it  is 
imperative for development practitioners and policy-makers to understand the reasons behind 
these low levels of adoption. 
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Figure 2: Awareness of Microfinance, by Country (average 2009-10) 
 
Source: Gallup World Poll 2009 and 2010. 
 
The Gallup data illuminates potential reasons for the low take-up of microfinance (Figure 
2). Asked if they are aware of any institutions in their community that help people obtain small 
business  loans,  16.2  percent  of  the  respondents  stated  that  they  had  never  heard  of  such 
institutions. An additional 46.2 percent stated that such institutions are not available in their 
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community. Certainly, a percentage of those reporting that microcredit was unavailable in their 
community might also simply be unaware of its presence, given that some form of MFIs had 
reached 85 percent of all depositors and borrowers in SSA by 2009 (CGAP and MIX, 2011). 
When taken together, these numbers point to exceedingly low levels of awareness.  
Sparse evidence from the literature also points towards awareness as part of the problem. 
In  an  intervention  aimed  at  urban  microenterprises  in  Sri  Lanka,  de  Mel,  McKenzie  and 
Woodruff (2011) find that providing more information about the loan product on offer by a 
regional development bank doubled the proportion of firms receiving a loan. There are a couple 
of  things  worth  bearing  in  mind  about  this  intervention:  first,  the  information  session  was 
combined  with  a  decrease  in  the  bureaucratic  requirements  for  the  loan,  so  the  impact  of 
information alone cannot be isolated. More importantly, the intervention entailed providing more 
details about the loan to clients who already knew about its availability. The SSA problem, on 
the other hand, centers on low awareness about the existence of MFIs and the availability of 
microloans as such. However, as suggested by Beck et al. (2011) financial literacy programs for 
households and enterprises might be able to address some of the nonfinancial constraints to 
borrowing, particularly in rural areas. 
Another fundamental challenge that might be keeping MFIs from making deep inroads 
into SSA, is that borrowing from formal financial institutions, in general, is very low (Figure 3). 
These  numbers  are  based  on  supply-side  data  collected  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF) directly from Central Banks around the world on the number of loan accounts. SSA shows 
very low loan penetration; for example, the number of loan accounts normalized by population is 
less than 10 percent, with the exception of a number of countries in Southern Africa. However, 
there is a great degree of country-level heterogeneity in this borrowing rate – the numbers range 14 
 
from less than 1 percent for the Central African Republic to over 40 percent for South Africa 
(Ardic, Heiman and Mylenko, 2011). An important caveat is that these data are supply-side 
indicators of financial usage and therefore do not correct for double-counting (e.g. one individual 
with multiple loans). Therefore, these numbers represent an upper bound on borrowing rates in 
these countries, and actual borrowing rates are likely even lower. 
 
Figure 3: Borrowing Behaviour, by Country (average 2008-09) 
 
Source: IMF-IFS Statistics, 2011. 
 
  It  is  striking  how  these  borrowing  rates  vary  by  per  capita  GDP:  South  Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland, the four countries with the highest borrowing penetration, 
are  also  among  the  10  richest  countries  in  Africa,  as  measured  by  GDP  (WB-WDI,  2011). 
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Similarly,  the  Central  African  Republic  and  Ethiopia,  countries  that  find  themselves  at  the 
bottom of the borrowing rate rankings, are also among the 10 with the lowest per capita GDP in 
all of Africa.  However, caution is required in interpreting this relationship, as the same factors 
that drive gains in income could be leading to an increase in borrowing rates. For example, one 
such factor might be local institutions. For instance, Mauro (1995) has shown that corruption has 
a  pernicious  effect  on  economic  growth  by  lowering  investment.  In  fact,  corruption  is  an 
endemic  problem  in  SSA.  The  “Corruption  Perceptions  Index”  published  by  Transparency 
International has consistently ranked SSA as one of the most corrupt regions in the world and in 
2010, 16 of the world‟s 30 most corrupt nations were in SSA.
3 The region also ranks dismally in 
the World Bank‟s Doing Business index
4, which rates countries based on how conducive their 
regulatory environment is to starting and operating a local firm. The rating incor porates several 
parameters like ease of registering property, getting credit and enforcing contracts. A low 
ranking in this index is indicative of weak institutions. It is highly likely that corruption could be 
one of the driving forces behind the low per capita GDP as well as the low borrowing rates in 
this region. 
Although it is difficult to glean any other  causes behind low usage of formal financial 
services from the Gallup survey, another potential candidate is “trust.”  The trust explanation is 
closely related to the problem of corrupt institutions that we just discussed. There are two ways 
in which trust, or social capital, can have an impact on the adoption of microfinance. Under the 
first mechanism, which is specific to microcredit, people are less likely to borrow under joint 
liability if there is low level of trust within their community. Cassar and Wydick (2010) provide 
laboratory evidence indicative of support for this hypothesis. They find a positive correlation 
                                                           
3 Complete data is available at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. 
4 Complete data is available at: http://doingbusiness.org. 16 
 
between  contribution  rates  and  trust  levels  in  a  cross-country  group  lending  experiment. 
However,  the  prevalence  of  ROSCAs  in  SSA  suggests  high  levels  of  intra-community  trust 
(Ardener and Burman, 1995), refuting this explanation.  
The other “trust-channel” is the positive relationship between social capital and financial 
development in general. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) were the first to document this 
phenomenon for Italy by showing that individuals hailing from high social capital areas are more 
likely to use checks and to have access to institutional credit. They also show that the causality is 
particularly strong in regions with low levels of education and weak judicial enforcement. This 
correlation is also highlighted by Calderon, Chong and Galindo (2002), who compiled cross-
country  evidence showing that  a one standard  deviation  improvement  in  the trust  indicators 
brings about an expansion in the financial market of a country that is equal in magnitude to 19 
percent of GDP.  
The prevalence of ROSCAs suggests that a level of individual trustiness exists in SSA, 
which  suggests  that  this  channel  might  be  operating  through  trust  in  institutions.  We  have 
already  discussed  that  the  region  is  fraught  with  corruption.  Banks  have  also  not  remained 
untainted by this systemic malaise. The banking sector in 32 SSA countries faced mild to severe 
crises related to solvency and non-performing assets in the late 1980s and 1990s (Caprio and 
Klingbiel, 2003). In several instances, the crisis was so crippling that a substantial proportion of 
the country‟s GDP was lost, and several banks had to be shut down. Here‟s a sampling of the 
extent of the losses, expressed as a percentage of the GDP of the country in question for the year 
of the respective crisis: Benin – 17 percent, Cote d‟Ivoire – 25 percent, Mauritiana – 15 percent, 
Senegal – 17 percent, Tanzania – 10 percent (Caprio and Klingbiel, 2003).  17 
 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) and Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) have also 
documented the extremely poor financial health of the SSA banking sector. It is also important to 
remember that in SSA, while the banking sector has come a long way, collective memory has 
not. Dupas et al. (2011) find that risk of embezzlement and unreliability of the bank are stated as 
reasons for low usage of savings accounts in a recent study based in Western Kenya. This may 
explain part of the reason why people still prefer to borrow and lend within their small circle of 
family and friends. 
How much of the meager adoption rates are explained by the factors which we have 
explored above is still an open question. To some degree, this is not an SSA-specific problem 
since in their Hyderabad-based study Banerjee et al. (2009) also find that the introduction of an 
MFI to a new area leads to an increase of merely 8.3 percent in the probability of receiving a 
loan from a MFI. However, to the extent that trust and awareness are significant explanatory 
factors, it would be realistic to expect that as the presence of MFIs becomes older in the region, 
both of those problems might become less severe. Even in the Hyderabad study, the impacts 
were analyzed just 15-18 months from roll-out, and newness could certainly be driving part of 
the low adoption.  
 
4.  Savings in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Meanwhile, as inconclusive evidence around credit‟s potential has continued to trickle in, 
the  focus  of  microfinance  practitioners  has  become  much  broader  to  include  other  financial 
services  like  microinsurance,  micropensions,  and  especially  microsavings.  The  epiphany that 
unleashed the shift toward microsavings is this: if the poor can borrow their way out of poverty, 
they can equally well save their way out of it.  Having a nest egg should be as effective as a loan 18 
 
in relaxing credit constraints. In fact, findings from the Gallup survey confirm this reasoning 
(Figure 4). Asked about the most important reason why people save money, 29 percent provide a 
precautionary motive behind their most important reason to save, stating saving for either “a 
rainy day” or “in case we get sick”. The second most important reason that people report saving 
is “to start a business” (almost 20%). These numbers suggest that almost half of the people 
surveyed are actually using savings for purposes that credit was either supposed to, or is billed 
to, serve. What is more, enabling savings neither creates the burden of debt, nor the resource 
diversion that credit does.  
 
Figure 4: Reasons for Saving (average 2009-10 over SSA countries) 
 
   Source: Gallup World Poll 2009 and 2010. 
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However, before this willingness to save can be harnessed towards actual gains on the 
ground, we need to better understand the challenges that the poor might face in setting money 
aside as savings.  Banerjee and Duflo (2007) have documented that a huge proportion of the poor 
still lack access to formal banking services. Chaia et al. (2009) estimate that 80 percent of the 
entire adult population in SSA was unbanked at the beginning of the 2000s. Expectedly, the 
penetration  numbers  are  much  worse  for  those  living  below  the  poverty  line:  Gaul  (2011) 
calculates the absolute difference between the population living below the poverty line and the 
population with access to financial services, and finds that the numbers are as high as 80 million 
for Nigeria and 48 million for Congo. While this is a somewhat crude and imprecise way to 
measure  financial inclusion,  it does  underline the fact  that a vast  majority of the very poor 
continue to be bypassed by financial institutions. Data from IMF statistics also reflects this lack 
of access to financial services. The number of deposit accounts as a percentage of population is a 
meager 19 percent on average (excluding South Africa) (Figure 5). Again, the caveat applies that 
these are supply-side data that do not control  for multiple and dormant  accounts and actual 
formal bank penetration is likely much lower. 
The lack of access to formal financial institutions drives the poor to save in sub-optimal 
ways. For instance, the widely prevalent practice of saving through Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs) in Africa comes with a significant risk of the ROSCA itself collapsing 
before all the members have „won‟ the draw. Similarly, in an RCT based in rural Kenya, Dupas 
and  Robinson  (2011a)  offered  savings  accounts  to  163  microentrepreneurs.  These  accounts 
provided no interest and entailed a withdrawal fee, which effectively means that they had a 
negative interest rate. They find that 53 percent of those who were offered this account chose to 
save  through  it,  implying  that  they  could  not  access  a  better  way  to  channel  their  savings. 20 
 
Importantly, the negative return on the accounts isn‟t merely an experimental gimmick. Besley 
(1995)  documents  that  moneylenders  in  Western  Africa  have  been  successfully  charging 
significant withdrawal fees on deposits.  
Figure 5: Deposit Accounts, by Country (average 2008-09) 
 
Source: IMF-IFS Statistics, 2011. 
 
The challenges presented by a lack of financial access get compounded for people who 
have present-biased preferences and, lacking any formal vehicles to save, just choose to consume 
it. However, in an RCT based in the Philippines, Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) find that when 
offered savings accounts that require commitment, people with such preferences are more likely 
to  sign  up.  Furthermore,  Dupas  and  Robinson  (2011b)  find  that  providing  informal  savings 
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mechanisms (like a lockbox) to the poor increases their investment towards preventive health, 
suggesting that they were making suboptimal health choices in the absence of access to a savings 
vehicle. This suggests that in addition to financial access, provision of the right kind of savings 
technologies is also imperative in enabling savings.  
In addition, even if the poor do manage to save at home on their own, they face the risk 
of the money being appropriated by others, like their spouse, friends or members of the extended 
family. This is a non-trivial risk and Jakiela and Ozier (2011) provide experimental evidence 
from Kenya demonstrating that participants were willing to forego expected earnings in order to 
conceal the size of their initial endowment so that they could avoid sharing it with those in their 
network.  Interestingly,  Brune  et  al.  (2011)  find  that  commitment  savings  accounts  can  also 
provide protection from such appropriation by minimizing access to the funds that have already 
been banked. 
For anybody who has followed the arc along which microcredit evolved, it is natural to 
wonder  if  the  evidence  from  the  ground  for  microsavings  supports  what  seems  like  a  very 
promising  theory  on  paper.  So  far,  we  have  only  one  good  quality  RCT  on  the  impact  of 
microsavings,  and the evidence from  that is  promising.  In the Dupas  and Robinson (2011a) 
experiment that has been mentioned earlier, we find that those who were offered accounts save 
more and show a significant increase in business investment and even in personal consumption 
expenditures. It shouldn‟t be excessive to conjecture here that the increase in consumption was a 
result of increased profits, which in turn came about due to the increase in investment. Further, 
the study finds a decrease in average poverty, something that RCTs of microcredit have failed to 
demonstrate unambiguously. 22 
 
There also exists a small body of studies that looks at the impact of expanding access to 
banking services in general, i.e. both savings as well as credit products. Burgess and Pande 
(2005)  and  Bruhn  and  Love  (2009)  find  evidence  in  India  and  Mexico,  respectively,  that 
providing access to banking to low-income clients leads to an increase in new business creation 
(Mexico) and to a reduction in poverty (India and Mexico). Since credit alone has not been 
shown to have discernible effects on either of these outcomes, it might be possible to surmise 
from here that at least some of these effects stemmed from having access to dependable savings 
technologies. 
 
4.1    How to Enable Savings? 
The looming policy question is about how we can make savings technologies accessible 
to the poor.  Various developing countries are experimenting with novel schemes to facilitate 
savings. In some cases, these are being driven by the state, like in India, where the Central Bank 
directed all commercial banks in late 2005 to provide „no frills‟ bank accounts to the poor. These 
accounts can be opened and operated with miniscule to no money, making it easier for the poor 
to  save.  By  2008,  more  than  15  million  interest-paying  no-frills  accounts  had  been  opened 
(Thyagarajan and Venkatesan, 2008). In other cases, the microsavings movement has completely 
bypassed the state‟s institutional set-up, utilizing the private sector instead. The Philippines and 
Kenya are great examples for that. In fact, the M-PESA service in Kenya (through which people 
can transfer, deposit and withdraw money using their cell phones) has become such a runaway 
success since it was first launched in 2007, that it now covers 70 percent of Kenyan households 
and processes more transactions domestically than Western Union does globally (Kendall, 2010; 
Mas and Radcliffe, 2010). As of today, there are more than 10 million M-PESA subscribers in 23 
 
the country, while only 4 million hold bank accounts (Microfinancefocus, 2011). These numbers 
underscore the unprecedented degree of financial inclusion that has been heralded by M-PESA 
and the reason why it is being hailed as a model to be emulated in developing countries. Other 
models are being tried out in other parts of the world: Brazil, Mexico and India, for example, are 
experimenting with banking correspondents, i.e. non-bank agents such as retail stores or post 
offices with whom people can make their banking transactions (McKinsey & Company, 2010; 
Reserve Bank of India, 2006).  
While these initiatives for expanding financial access are a step in the right direction, 
they may still prove entirely ineffectual in the face of the trust problems that we discussed earlier 
in the paper: if people are unwilling to borrow from untrustworthy institutions, they are likely 
even less willing to entrust them with their own money. As also mentioned earlier, this problem 
has already surfaced in one RCT, where people did not use free savings accounts because they 
did  not  trust  the  bank  (Dupas  et  al.,  2011).  Furthermore,  we  might  expect  this  issue  to  be 
particularly acute in SSA, which lags behind the rest of the world in providing deposit insurance 
(Demirgüç-Kunt,  Karacaovali  and  Laeven,  2005).  In  response,  the  Grameen  Foundation  has 
called for an institution, either a local or an international non-profit organization or a consortium 
of  MFIs,  to  provide  this  insurance  in  order  to  win  depositor  confidence  (Counts  and 
Meriweather, 2008).  
In the meantime, as formal savings institutions continue to evolve, it would be useful for 
policy-makers and aid-agencies to remember that even informal (and inexpensive) mechanisms 
like lockboxes have proved to be highly effective in promoting savings (Dupas and Robinson, 
2011b; Kristoff, 2009).  
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5.  Conclusion 
This  paper  has  reviewed  evidence  from  the  literature  and  individual-level  surveys  in 
order to develop a better informed perspective on the pros and cons of microfinance for setting 
up and expanding businesses. The verdict seems to be that while microcredit is primarily useful 
as a consumption-smoothing and risk-management tool, microsavings potentially has a greater 
role to play in wealth creation. Further, neither savings nor credit would be able to do much by 
way of anything in an environment that does not inspire public confidence. The world‟s poor 
desperately need financial innovations that help them save, borrow and lend and an environment 
that helps them do so securely. 
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